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FAQ for Internship Programs Back
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Question 10. Under the Matching Program, can't people still
make "under the table" deals?
It is possible for a site and an applicant to violate APPIC Match
Policies by negotiating a "deal." However, this behavior will
often penalize the person(s) attempting such a deal instead of
providing them with an advantage. Thus, those who engage in such
"under the table" deals will only end up hurting themselves.
For example, let's suppose a Training Director, Susan, has one
internship position available. She has ranked an applicant, Frank,
as number five on her Rank Order List. Frank has ranked Susan's
site as third on his own Rank Order List. However, several days
before the deadline for list submission, Susan calls Frank and
offers him a deal: "I'll rank you number one if you rank me number
one" (this is, of course, a clear violation of APPIC policies).
Frank agrees to this arrangement. In this example, two results
are then possible:
- Susan and Frank both keep to their agreement listing each
other as their number one choice, and are thus matched by the
Matching Program. However, while both may feel that they've
been successful, they've both actually lost out on better opportunities.
Susan has lost the opportunity to obtain the first four candidates
on her list, and Frank has given up the opportunity to obtain
his top two internship sites.
If Susan hadn't attempted this "deal", listing Frank as her
fifth choice would not have reduced her chances of being matched
with Frank. The computer would simply have tried to obtain her
top four applicants before attempting to match her with Frank.
Similarly, Frank would have been better served by listing Susan
as third, as it wouldn't reduce his chances of being matched
with Susan in the event that his top two choices did not come
through.
- One party keeps to the agreement by ranking the other party
as their top choice, but the other party decides to back out
of the "deal" and not change his/her rankings (under the Matching
Program, verbal commitments or "deals" are non-binding). In
this scenario, the party who changed their rankings has hurt
themselves, while the party who does not change their rankings
has gained a potential advantage.
As can be seen from this example, changing your rankings to anything
but your "true" preferences is never advantageous. Thus, the only
way that you can profit from an "under-the-table deal" is to be
doubly-dishonest by (1) agreeing to make the deal in the first
place (a violation of APPIC policies), and (2) reneging on your
part of the deal, thus inducing the other party to change their
rankings without changing your own.
This example points out one of the basic tenets of the matching
program: the best "strategy" in submitting Rank Order Lists is
to provide your true preferences, without regard to the likelihood
of obtaining a particular site or applicant. As can be seen from
this example, using any other strategy only hurts yourself.
Back to FAQ
6 March 2002
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